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NOTES AND COMMENTS
A conclusion drawn from the authorities cited seems to leave
the court with two alternatives. It may recede from the position
taken in the Caso case and declare the remedy provided by Chap-
ter 62, Laws of 1931, to be inadequate, or it may adhere to that
position thereby adopting a view opposed to that heretofore accepted
in this state. The result of adopting the latter alternative would
seem to be to drive litigants into the federal courts.
SAuL D. HERmAN.
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND PowERs OF SALE. The rule
against perpetuities is usually stated as prohibiting the creation of
future interests or estates, which by possibility may not become
vested within a life or lives in being and twenty-one years, together
with the period of gestation, where the latter is necessary to cover
cases of posthumous birth.' It is not enough that the estate may
possibly or even probably vest within the time limited by the rule,
but the court must be able to see by looking at the document creat-
ing the estate that the estate will necessarily vest within the time.
2
The Rule against Perpetuities applies in the case of equitable as well
as legal interests. Therefore, the creation of a trust or equitable
interest, which may not vest in the object of the trust -within the
time limited by law for the vesting of legal estates, will be nugatory 3
It is also well settled that the Rule against Perpetuities applies as
well to powers over property as to interests and estates therein.
4
It is the purpose of this note to discuss some of the problems in-
volved in applying the Rule against Perpetuities to the case where
a trust has been created by will by which the trustees are given a
power of sale.5 In an effort to eliminate much of the confusion and
inconsistencies winch seem to have invaded this branch of the law,
dent Commusson, 23 Fed (2d) 109 (1918) Hall City Ry. Co. -V. Youngquist,
32 Fed. (2d) 819 (1929) Robmnson. v. Campbell, 16 U. S. 212, 4 L. Ed. 372
(1818) Boyle 'v. Zacharte, 31 U. S. 648, 8 L. Ed. 532 (1832) McConehay v.
Wrtght, 121 U. S. 201, 7 S. Ct. 94, 30 L. Ed. 932 (1887) Chicago, B & Q. Ry.
'v. Osborne, 265 U. S. 14, 44 S. Ct. 431, 68 L. Ed. 878 (1924).
121 R. C. L. 282; 48 C. J. 937 for a historical review of the rule, see
Gray on the Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed.) secs. 123-200, and Perry
on Trusts (7th ed.) Vol 1, page 632. This rule has been altered by statute
in many states, an'd, generally speaking, statutory additions and substitu-
tions have been in the direction of increased stringency, 48 C. J. 1000. See
Tiffany on Real Property (2nd ed.), Vol 1, sec. 189, for an outline of these
statutory changes. The rule is not changed by statute in Washington.
21 R. C. L. 289; Foulke on Perpetuities, sec. 342; 48 C. J. 942.
'Perry on Trusts (7th ed.), Vol. 1, page 639; Norfolk's Case, 1 Vern.
164, O'Hare v. Johnston, 273 Ill. 458, 113 N. E. 127 (1916) Andrews v.
Ltncoln, 95 Me. 541, 50 Atl. 898 (1901) Clossett v. Burtchaell, 112 Ore. 585,
230 Pac. 554 (1924).
'48 C. J. 977 Larence's Estate, 136 Pa. 354, 80 Atl. 85, 20 Am. St. Rep.
925, 11 L. R. A. 185 (1891) Gray on the Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd
ed.), sec. 474a, says: "Sometimes a power is spoken of as too remote; this
is a natural, but it is not an exact, mode of expression, it is not the power
which is too remote, but the estate or interest appointed by it." To like
effect see 16 Col. L. Rev. 537.
5 The rule has still wider application in the case of powers of appoint-
ment. See 49 C. J. 1261.
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a classification of the cases according to the situs and quantum of
the interests devised has been attempted.
I. LEGAL AND EQUITABLE TITLE VESTED IN BEFIIAiIES
Probably the great majority of wills provide for an inmediate
vesting of the complete legal and equitable fee in the beneficiaries,
which is accomplished by a simple devise to them by name, and
making no provision for a further interest in the property to be
settled upon another. Even in such a case, it is a common prac-
tice to give the executor of the estate, by means of executing
a non-intervention will, a power of sale for the purpose of
liquidating and distributing the estate.' In this type of situation,
however, it will be readily seen that the Rule against Perpetuities
has no application, since the equitable interest in fee is immediately
vested in the beneficiaries, and such power as the executor has in
dealing with the legal title can only affect the beneficiaries' time
of enjoyment, and not the vesting of their estates.'
This type of devise should be distinguished from the case where the
complete equitable fee is devised to beneficiaries, subject to being
defeated by the exercise of a power of sale given to executors. In
such a case the exercise of the power of sale operates only as a condi-
tion subsequent upon the complete vested fee, and hence is not objec-
tionable to the rule, which applies only to conditions precedent to
vesting.'
II. LEGAL TITLE DEVISED TO TRUSTEES AND EQUITABLE TITLE
DEVISED TO BENEFICIARIES.
Where the equitable interest which is devised to the beneficiaries
is the complete equitable title, then, although the legal title be
devised to trustees, and they be empowered to sell the property for
the purpose of distributing or investing the same, there is no pos-
sible application of the Rule against Perpetuities. 9 This is true for
the reason that there is no provision for a vesting of equitable inter-
ests except the immediate vesting in the beneficiaries at the time
of the testator's death. Moreover, although the case is then one for
the application of the Rule against Perpetual Restrains upon Alien-
6 This may also occur where the court holds the vesting of title in the
trustee to be invalid, but permits him, to retain a power of sale for a reason-
able time, Miller v. Weston, 67 Colo. 534, 189 Pac. 610 (1920). The same
situation is presented where trustees are granted a power of sale coupled
with the title, and the title vests in the beneficiaries, under the terms of
the will, before the power has been exercised. The court may then permit
such power to remain for a reasonable time. In re Sudeley, 1 Ch. 334
(1894) In re Dyson, 27 Ch. 720 (1896) Roland R. Foulke, writing in 16
Col. L. Rev. 544, likens such power of sale in executors to mere warrants
of attorney
In re Cooper's Estate, 150 Pa. 576, 24 Atl. 1057, 30 Am. St. Rep. 829.
Godefroi on Trusts and Trustees (5th ed) p. 330.
823 R. C. L. 509. Eary v. Raunes, 73 W Va. 513, 80 S. E. 806 (1914), is
an interesting example of this type of case. Having first devised to cer-
tain children the land, which included the mineral in it, he then authorized
a sale of the mineral by executors for the benefit of other children, but
only on condition that it could be sold for ten dollars per acre. If it could
not be sold at that price or more per acre, then the mineral was to become
the property of the children upon whose land it was located, absolutelyI Strout v. Strout, 117 Me. 357, 104 Atl 577 (1918).
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ation, there is no actual violation of the rule, since it is usually held
that the equitable owners can call upon the holders of the legal title
at any time, and hence as a practical matter there is no restraint
upon the alienation of the fee.10
Where the equitable interest winch is devised to the beneficiaries
is not the complete equitable title, but is only a beneficial use of the
property for life or for years, the case becomes one for the applica-
tion of the Rule against Perpetuities. The problem then becomes
one of determining whether the power of sale wnch the trustee has
m connection with the legal title devised to him is such as to make
certain that the shift in the equitable interest will be made within
lives in being and twenty-one years thereafter." In connection
with this type of case, also should be considered the case where
there is no present beneficial use provided for, but the same is held
in abeyance until the trustees exercise the power of sale, since the
effect in such a case is identical with the effect of a provision for a
shift in a present beneficial use. A more detailed classification of
cases falling within this type of situation will be attempted for the
purpose of emphasizing the substantial factual distinctions which
exist among the cases, and their effect upon the results attained in
the decisions.
a. PowER Op SALE EXPRESSLY LIMITED TO IvEs IN BEING An
TWENTY-ONE YEARS THEREAFTER.
This type of provision represents the ordinary trust devise where-
by trustees are given a power to sell the property and to divide the
proceeds among named or ascertainable beneficiaries. By reason of
the fact that the interests of such named beneficiaries may be con-
tingent, or because they are to be ascertained by future events, the
beneficiaries may have no present vested interest. But if, as
is assumed under this sub-head, the power of sale is expressly lim-
ited to lives in being and twenty-one years thereafter, there is no
possible violation of the Rule against Perpetuities. This express
limitation may be obtained by limiting the power of sale itself, or
by limiting the duration of the trust. 2 Either the power of sale
or the duration of the trust may be limited by stating the limita-
tion m years, or by date, or by reference to lives in being. In any
event, where such limitation so provides that the shift in the vested
interest must necessarily occur within lives in being and twenty-
one years thereafter, there is no violation of the Rule against Per-
petuities.
b. PowER oF SALE NOT EXPRE SLY LIMITED TO LivEs m BEING AND
TWENTY-ONE YEaRs THEREAFTER.
This type of case involves some of the most difficult problems
o Gray on the Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed.) sec. 509k.
The power of sale which the trustee has in this type of situation has
been likened to a special power of appointment by Roland R. Foulke, in
16 Col. L. Rev. 630. The writer therefore concludes: "Consequently, the
period prescribed by the rule runs from the time of the creation of the
trust and the limitation made by the trustee under the power are judged,
as to their remoteness, accordingly."
2Likewise, where the purpose for which a power of sale was given has
been accomplished or has failed, the power ceases. Perry on Trusts (7th
ed.), Vol. 1, page 444; Trask v. Sturges, 170 N. Y. 482, 63 N. E. 534, (1902).
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related to the effect of the Rule against Perpetuities upon Powers
of Sale. The situation now to be considered is where the trustee is
given power to sell and distribute the proceeds to persons not now
holding a vested interest, in which the duration of the power is
not expressly limited to lives in being and twenty-one years there-
after. In such a case the court is confronted with the problem of
construing the testator's intent, for the purpose of determining
whether the will, by necessary implication, limits the duration of
the power within the period of remotenesss. If such necessary
implication is to be drawn from the will, then the provision is valid
-if it cannot be drawn from the will, the provision is void as con-
stituting a perpetuity Before referring to the individual types
of cases under this heading, some referece should first be made to a
rule of construction which courts uniformly adopt in determining
whether or not the provision is void for remoteness. No better state-
ment can, perhaps, be made of the rule referred to than that by
Professor Gray
"The Rule against Perpetuities is not a rule of construe-
tion, but a peremptory command of law It is not, like a
rule of construction, a test, more or less artificial, to deter-
mine intention. Its object is to defeat intention. There-
fore, every provision in a will or settlement is to be con-
strued as if the rule did not exist, and then to the provision
so construed the rule is to be remorselessly applied.
"But there is a legitimate use of the Rule against Per-
petuities in matters of construction. When the expression
which a testator uses is really ambiguous, and is fairly
capable of two constructions, one of which would produce a
legal result, and the other a result that would be bad for
remoteness, it is a fair presumption that the testator
meant to create a legal rather than an illegal interest.
While it is not to be conclusively presumed that a testator
knew the Rule against Perpetuities, for such a presump-
tion would often involve the absurdity that a testator
intended to make a will which he was aware the law would
not carry into effect, there is, on the other hand, no pre-
sumption that he did not know it, and therefore the fact
that a provision would be too remote, if construed in a cer-
tain way, is a reason for supposing that it was not intended
to be construed in that way, which, although it cannot avail
against a clear form of words, may well be held to govern
when the expression is ambiguous." 3
1. DURATION OF POWER SET FORTH IN GENERAL TERms
There appear to be no cases involving a power of sale which sets
forth the duration of the power in general terms, such as "for as
13 Gray on the Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed.), secs. 629 and 633. To
the same effect see 48 C. J. 997 Godefrol on Trusts and Trustees (5th ed.),
page 646.
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long a period as legally possible." But, upoA analogy to cases which
limit the duration of the trust in such language, such a power of
sale might be deemed valid. Thus in Fichse v. Brown4 the testator
gave his property in trust for the benefit of forty-two named
beneficiaries and provided that the trust should remain in effect
"for as long a period as legally possible." The Supreme Court
of the United States held that the testator had shown by the use of
this language that he realized that there were limits upon the
length of time that a trust could continue, and that (to give effect
to his expressed intention that it should remain in effect for as
long a time as legally possible) he must have intended to limit
the duration of the trust to twenty-one years after the death of
the last named annuitant. This case appears to be a proper one
for invoking the rule of construction set forth in the second par-
agraph of the quotation from Professor Gray, above.
2. POWER To SELL AT A DFImnTs TimE "MORE OR LEss."
In Brandenburg v. Thorndyke 5 the testator left his residuary
estate to trustees for his wife's life, and then provided "At the
expiration of three years from the death of my wife, or at said time,
whether earlier or later, as may, in the discretion of the trustees,
be found expedient and practicable for the final settlement and
disposition of my estate, the trustees shall convey and transfer said
fund in equal shares." The court held that the provision did not
violate the Rule against Perpetuities, because "it does not leave it
to the unlimited discretion of the trustees to delay the vesting or
enjoyment of the estates to such time as they think expedient."
Professor Gray believes that the decision was correct, saying-
"A fair construction of the will was that the testator by
the expression, 'at the expiration of three years from the
death of my wife, or at such time, whether earlier or later,
as may, in the discretion of the trustees be found expedient
and practicable,' meant 'at such time, about three years,
as the trustees may determine,' and certainly a period
exceeding twenty-one years is not 'about three years' "I
3. POWER TO SELL WITHIN A "REAsONABLE" TImE.
As stated by an authority on Trusts
"Where the trust is to sell within a reasonable time after
the death of the life beneficiaries and to divide the pro-
ceeds among persons, some of whom were not in being at
the time the trust was created, it has been held that the
trust for sale and division does not violate the rule against
perpetuities, since the reasonable time during which the
sale is to be made and the trust terminated, cannot have
been intended to exceed twenty-one years."' 1
"211 U. S. 321, 29 Sup. Ct. 106, 53 L. Ed. 202 (1908), commented on in
20 Har. L. Rev. 221, 9 Col. L. Rev. 275.
139 Mass. 102, 28 N. E. 575 (1885).
18 Gray on the Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed.), see 214c.
"Perry on Trusts (7th ed.), Vol. 1, page 641.
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Whether the author was referring to an express provision for the
exercise of the power within a "reasonable" time or whether that
was to be determined by implication, is not made clear. In any
event the cases cited in support of the statement appear not to be,
in fact, authority upon that point since they are substantially dis-
tinguishable upon their facts. Moreover, this writer was unable
to find any cases expressly providing for the exercise of such a
power of sale within a "reasonable time."1 8 It is submitted that
such a provision cannot be logically construed as necessarily vest-
ing within lives in being and twenty-one years thereafter, in view
of the rule of construction set forth in the first paragraph of
the quotation from Professor Gray, above. Unless "reasonable-
ness" is construed in reference to the period of remoteness (which
is forbidden by the rule of construction referred to), there is
probably no sound reason for holding that such provision places the
duration of the power upon that absolutely certain basis required
by the Rule against Perpetuities.
4. COMMENCEMENT OR DURATION OP POWER OP SALE MEASURED BY
AN EVENT TO OCCUR IN THE FUTURE.
No cases involving powers of sale were found which provided
for the commencement of the power or the duration thereof to b6
measured by the occurrence of a future event. But analogy to cases
involving the duration of trusts may again be resorted to for the
purpose of indicating the result to follow from such a provision
respecting powers of sale. In Coit v. Comstock, 9 there was a devise
to trustees to receive the rents and income "until an Act of Incor-
poration can be obtained from the General Assembly of the State,"
and then to convey the property to such corporation for charitable
purposes. The court upheld the trust, saying- "It is clear, there-
fore, that a reasonable time only for the act to be obtained was con-
templated by the testator." In Belfield v. Booth,20 it was held that
a period of fourteen years, to begin after the executor has settled
with the judge of probate, must begin within seven years from the
testator's death, since the court was not to presume that the settle-
ment of the estate will or can be delayed beyond a reasonable time.
The obvious objection to these decisions is that they constitute a
clear violation of the rule of construction that the intention of the
testator must be determined without reference to the Rule against
Perpetuities. Professor Gray finds that these decisions are the
result of special conditions existing in Connecticut, for he says
"The case of Belfield v. Booth is an interesting illustration
how the introduction or rejection of a legal doctrine may
bring about unexpected consequences. Connecticut repu-
18 Miller v. Weston, note (6) supra, used those words, but also additional
words indicating that the testator meant the power to be exercised in
about two years. This takes the case within the rule of Brandenbury v.
Thorndike, note (13) supra, but in any event the equitable title was vested
in Miller v. Weston.
9 51 Conn. 352 (1883)
2063 Conn. 299, 27 Atl. 585 (1893).
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diated the doctrine of cy pres, then came the case of Coit
v. Comstock, easily to be decided under the doctrine of cy
pres, but for which the Court, to preserve the form of con-
sistency, had to invent several novelties, among others this
implication of "reasonable time," to avoid the objection
of remoteness, and from Coit v. Comstock, this idea has
traveled to Belfield v. Booth, and is there no longer con-
fined to charities." 21
5. POWER TO SELL "AT SUCH TimEs AS THE TRusTEEs S:ALL
DEEm BEST."
The recent Washington case of Denny v. Hyland,22 which is the
first case to be decided in this jurisdiction involving the Rule
against Perpetuities, raises the issue of the validity of a power to
sell "at such times as the trustees shall deem best." The pub-
lished opinion of the court does not refer to this problem, but it
was raised specifically by able and exhaustive briefs for and against
granting a petition for a rehearing. The petition was denied, and
inferentially the court decided against the proposition contended
for. Because of the manner in which the question was disposed
of, however, it may not necessarily settle the question m this juris-
diction. The specific proposition dealt with in the petitions for
and against rehearing was stated as follows.
"No time being fixed for distribution, except within the
discretion of the trustees, disposition must, in the
exercise of the lawful discretion vested in the trustees,
be made within a reasonable time, which is necessarily with-
in the period allowed by the Rule against Perpetuities."
The cases cited in support of this contention appear to be substan-
tially distinguishable upon their facts,2 3 and no cases appear to
have been cited to contradict the exact proposition. Moreover, the
writer was unable to discover a single case which dealt with the
specific problem. Any definite solution of the question must
apparently be determined by a sort to fundamental principles
and an analysis of the circumstances of this particular case.
A painstaking analysis of the problem raised by this particular
case would be beyond the scope of the general discussion being
21 Gray on the Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed.) sec. 214d. An iden-
tical situation in Virginia has produced a similar result. See Literary
Fund v. Dawson, 1 Rob. 402; Kinnasrd v. Miller, 25 Grat. 107 and comment
In Gray, sec. 616. Likewise the same cause and effect has occured in
Iowa. Miller v. Chittenden, 2 Iowa 315, 4 Iowa 252; Johnson v. Mayne,
4 Iowa 180; ,Byers v. McCartney, 62 Iowa 339- Phillips v. Harrow, 93 Iowa
92, 61 N. W 434 (1894) Gray, see. 625.
162 Wash. 68, 297 Pac. 1083 (1931).
' The cases cited in favor of this proposition and the footnotes in
which they appear herein, are as follows: Strout v. Strout (9) Perry on
Trusts, sec. 383 (17) Miller v. Weston, (6) and (18) Brandenburg V.
Thorndike, (15) In re Sudeley, (6) In re Dyson, (6) Eary v. Ratnes,
(8) In re Cooper's Estate, (7).
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attempted in this note. It may be properly observed, however, that
there seems to be a substantial argument in favor of the validity
of this type of testamentary provision. This argument is based
upon an application of fundamental trust principles to the situation
in question. Unless trustees are given an absolute discretion
whether or not the power need ever be exercised,2" it would seem
that a mere discretion as to the time of exercising it would not give
trustees power to defeat the trust entirely by refusing to exercise
the power.25 If this is the case, there seems to be no logical diffi-
culty in permitting the probate court to take judicial notice of those
limitations upon the discretion of trustees. It will be observed that
in doing so the court is not presuming the intention of the testator,
but is recognizing the duties of trustees, such that there is no breach
of the rule of construction set forth in the first paragraph quoted
from Professor Gray, above. It should be further noted, that
whatever decision the court reaches in this regard, there need be
no fear of a relaxing of the Rule Against Perpetuities, but at worst
only a misconstruction of the obligations of trustees, since in find-
ing the trust to be valid, the court thereby makes certain the equit-
able interests will vest within lives in being and twenty-one years
thereafter. 26
CONCLUSION.
The Rule against Perpetuities is involved only in cases of volun-
tary transactions, such as by executing a will or by establishing a
trust inter vivos. Hence compliance with the rule is at all times
within the control of him who is vitally interested in compliance.
In this matter, as in the case of directing the course of all volun-
tary relationships, the role of the lawyer is especially important,
since he has it within his power to assure the accomplishment of
his client's intentions, and at the same time to reduce to a minimum
the likelihood of future litigation. With particular reference to
Powers of Sale and the Rule against Perpetuities, the proper course
is obvious. If the case is one for the proper application of the
Rule against Perpetuities, 7 the time for the exercise of the power
2, Discretionary powers may be imperative or optional, depending upon
whether or not the power, though discretionary must ever be exercised.
Perry on Trusts (7th ed.), sec. 507, page 852.
SLewin on Trusts (13th ed.), pages 392 and 1062; Herriott v. Good,
153 Ky 418, 155 S. W 761 (1913). Perry on Trusts (7th ed.) page 858:
"The discretion of the trustee will not be controlled or questioned so long
as he is not guilty of bad faith or abuse of the power and trust; but it is
difficult, if not impossible, to create in the trustee such unbounded power
as to preclude a court of equity from controlling him when he acts fraud-
ulently, or palpably abuses his power, as by unreasonably refusing to exer-
cise it, or undertaking to exercise it in an unreasonable manner."
2*There appears to be a curious attitude of mind with regard to this
matter, the language of the courts quite often indicating that the court
feared that to hold the trust valid in a close case would be to relax the
Rule Against Perpetuities. But in holding a trust valid, the court is
decreeing that the interests will vest within the period of remoteness, so
that instead of relaxing the rule, the court is specifically applying and
enforcing it. What may be involved, however, is a misconstruction of the
intention of the testator, or a misapplication of some rule of law as to the
legal effect of certain devises, in reaching the conclusion that the interest
must vest within the period.
2" See the second paragraph of 11, above.
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should be expressly limited within such time that no violation of
the rule is possible, under any reasonable construction. This may
be done by limiting the duration of the power to a specific length
of time within the period of remoteness, or by limiting its duration
in reference to lives in being at the time of the testator's death.
Should this practical suggestion be generally followed, we might
hope to be presented with the problem in Washington courts as
rarely in the future as it has apparently arisen in the past.
FRaERCK G. HAMLEY.
RECENT CASES
CoRroRATIN-TausT FuND DOCTRINE-RIGHT TO RExsciN STOCK SUBSCRIP-
TION ATER INSOLVENCy. An insolvent corporation bought stock on the open'
market and sold it as treasury stock to the plaintiff, who seeks rescission
because of fraudulent misrepresentations. Defendant claimed that plaintiff
cannot rescind after insolvency as against the assignee of the corporation
because it would reduce the creditor's trust fund. Held: A subscriber for
the capital stock of a corporation may bring suit after insolvency of the
corporation for rescission of his subscription if (1) he has used due dili-.
gence and (2) has not profited by the transaction, or (3) misled others
to their detriment. The trust fund doctrine has no application to existing
creditors and prior indebtedness. Goodin v. Palace Stores Co., 64 Wash.
Dec. 538 (1931).
It will be observed that the above case involves a conflict between the
rights of creditors and a defrauded stockholder.
The doctrine that the assets of an insolvent corporation are a trust fund
for the benefit of all its creditors is said to be an invention of the courts
during the panic of the late nineteenth century when there was no federal
bankruptcy act. THE TRUST FUND DOCTRINE: A STUDY IN PSY-
CHOLOGY, 1 Wash. Law Rev. 81. It was established in Washington by the
cases of Thompson v. The Huron Lumbner Co., 4 Wash. 600, 30 Pac. 741,
(1892) Conover v. Hull, 10 Wash. 673, 39 Pac. 166, 4 Am. St. Rep. 819
(1895). It continues despite the bankruptcy act; Dysart v. Colonial Fire
Underwriter 142, Wash. 601, 254 Pac. 240 (1927) often being ground for
declaring a preference when that act is not; Benner v. Scandinaian
American Bank, 73 Wash. 488, 131 Pac. 1149, Ann. Cas. 1914 D 709 (1913)
because the good faith of the parties is not gone into; In re Elliott-O'Brzen
Co., 284 Fed. 507 (1922). Further the test of insolvency is different,
Jones v. Hoquiam Lumber d- Shingle Co., 98 Wash. 172, 167 Pac. 117 (1917)
the bankruptcy act holding a concern insolvent when at a fair valuation the
aggregate of its property is insufficient in amount to pay its debts;
Simpson v. Western Hardware & Metal Go., 97 Wash. 626, 167 Pac. 113
(1917) and the trust fund theory when it is unable to pay its debts In the
due course of business; Nixon v. Hendy Machine Works, 51 Wash. 459, 99
Pac. 11 (1909).
The court has limited the theory saying that where there is no depletion
of the corporation's assets the basis of the doctrine is removed. Terhune v.
Weise, 132 Wash. 208, 231 Pac. 954, 38 A. L. R. 94 (1925). Thus in exchange
for a contemporaneous loan an insolvent corporation may mortgage all
its assets; Olive v. Tyler, 257 Fed. 497 5 A. L. R. 557 (1919) though the
lender be a stockholder, Jensen v. American Bank of Spokane, 157 Wash.
240, 288 Pac. 660 (1930) or an officer, Terhune v. Wise, supra. A repay-
ment of a loan for a particular profitable transaction is not a preference;
Hoppe v. First National Bank, 137 Wash. 41, 241 Pac. 662 (1925) nor is
the altering of the character of a creditor's security, Brinker v. Peoples
Savings Bank, 144 Wash. 93, 256 Pac., 1025 (1927). By paying itself from a
corporation's funds which it holds a bank merely takes back a part of what
it has contributed; Smith v. National Bank of Commnerce, 142 Wash. 428,
253 Pac. 644 (1927) but see Woods v. Metropolitan National Bank, 126
Wash. 346, 218 Pac. 266 (1923). Under certain circumstances even a private
person may obtain a set-off. Dysart v. Colonial Fire Underwriters, supra.
